ABSTRACT Recently, Lin et al. proposed a new primitive identity-based (IB) homomorphic signature scheme and presented an ingenious implement by using any IB-signature scheme as a building block. In this paper, we consider a new type of attack on their scheme: Related-key attack (RKA) is introduced by Bellare and Kohno in 2003 and widely considered for kinds of cryptographic primitives. Specifically, for the first time, we define the RKA security of IB-homomorphic signature scheme. By modifying the signing secret key as its linear form, we prove that Lin et al.'s IB-homomorphic signature scheme is not RKA secure. But a slight modification of it yields an RKA secure one under the original assumptions. We also present security proof in detail. However, we remark that the reason why RKA on Lin et al.'s scheme can be successful lies in that RKA is outside of its security model. Finally, the numerical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that our modified scheme does not distinctly decrease the computational efficiency of Lin et al.'s scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Homomorphic signature scheme is first introduced by Johnson et al. in [14] and further developed by Boneh et al. in [6] for the purpose of defending against pollution attacks in Network Coding. Unlike the traditional signature scheme, it allows ones, who have not the signing secret key, to generate valid signature for ''new message'' with the restriction that it should be a combination of some authenticated messages. Nowadays, many candidate homomorphic signature schemes are proposed, such as [2] , [5] - [7] , [10] , [22] , and have been widely used in Network Coding [9] , [14] , [15] , Cloud Storage [21] , Electronic Business [16] . Hence, homomorphic signature has become a standard public key cryptographic primitive.
It is also widely known that, for public key cryptographic system, the management of public keys is rather complicated, which is often handled with certificates issued by a trusted center. In the certificate-based system, any entity needs an authenticated certificate for his/her
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Tony Thomas. public key. Hence, the scales of issuing and managing the certificate will have a sharp rise with the increasing of users' number. Moreover, those certificates also need to be frequently verified. As a result, in 1984, Shamir proposed the identity-based (IB) cryptography, which intends to overcome the shortcomings of public key certificates [20] . In identity-based system, user's public key can be directly derived from some known information, such as user's email address, his/her telephone number, or social insurance number etc., while the related secret key is generated from the combination of the known information and a system-level master secret key. Since then, many identity-based primitives appeared, such as identity-based encryption scheme, identity-based signature and identity-based key agreement scheme.
Recently, for the first time, Lin et al. extended the identitybased property to the primitive of (linearly) homomorphic signature scheme [16] . In particular, they first introduced the security model of IB-homomorphic signature and then gave an ingenious implement in the random oracle (RO) model based on the bilinear map and the assumption of computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH). In addition, they also claimed that their scheme is very suitable to be used in the hot research field of blockchain.
A. RKA
In 2003, Bellare and Kohno proposed a new type attack on a lot of cryptographic primitives or schemes: Relatedkey attack (RKA for short) [4] . Informally, in the model of RKA security, an adversary has physical access to some hardware device and is allowed to taper with and induce corresponding modifications of some internal state(s) in the hardware device, which may be an encryption/decryption key or a signing key, by using the fault injection technique. In order to finely describe how the adversary modify those secret information, a set of related-key derivation (RKD) functions is introduced [3] . Therefore, the RKA security is usually accompanied by some functions family and, in recent years, widely considered for kinds of cryptographic primitives including pseudorandom function [4] , public key encryption [23] , signature [18] , proof of retrievability [12] , network coding signature [8] , [13] etc..
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, for the first time, we introduce the RKA security to the new primitive: IB-homomorphic signature. Concretely, our main contributions are as follows.
• First, define the -RKA security model of identitybased homomorphic signature scheme, where consists of functions from the master key space SK to itself.
• Second, choosing the candidate IB-homomorphic scheme proposed by Lin et al. in [16] as the target, we present a successful RKA on it by modifying the master secret key as a linear form.
• Finally, we construct a -RKA secure IB-homomorphic signature scheme by modifying the one proposed by Lin et al. in [16] , and give the security proof under the assumptions that underlying IB-signature S is secure and the CDH-assumption holds. Here, = ({I }, lin ), where I is the identity function on S's secret key space and lin consists of all linear functions of the corresponding secret keys.
In a word, our improvement of the original Lin et al.'s IB-homomorphic signature scheme will be more conducive to providing better services for blockchain. In addition, we remark that, the IB-homomorphic signature scheme of Lin et al. is secure in their model but insecure in our new model, since the RKA security is not considered in their security model.
C. ORGANIZATIONS
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will introduce some basic notations and notions, which will be used in following sections. In Section 3, we recall the IB-homomorphic signature scheme of Lin et al., present a concrete RKA on it, and then revise it so that it achieves the -RKA security. In Section 4, we will give some discussions on the efficiency of our revised scheme. Finally, conclusions can be found in Section 5.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some basic notations and notions used in this paper. Notations. We always use λ as the security parameter for algorithms. For a natural number n, [n] denotes the set {1, 2, · · · , n}. Let S be a set, then s $ ← − S denotes uniformly and randomly choosing s from S. A vector in S n is always in the boldface type v and v i is its i-th component. For a prime q, Z q means the finite field {0, 1, · · · , q − 1}. We use PPT to denote probabilistic polynomial time. For an algorithm A, z ← A(x, y, · · · ) means that it will output z when the inputs are x, y, · · · . A function f (λ) of λ is called negligible if, for all integer c > 0, there exists a λ 0 ∈ Z satisfying that for any λ > λ 0 , it holds that f (λ) < λ −c .
A. BILINEAR MAP
Denote by G 1 , G 2 two cyclic groups with the same prime order q. A map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is called a bilinear map if it has the following properties.
1) Non-Degeneracy:
2) Bilinear: For any g, h ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z q , it holds that
3) Computable: For all g, h ∈ G 1 , the computation of e(g, h) can be efficient.
B. CDH ASSUMPTION
Let G be a cyclic group with prime order q ≥ 2 λ . Randomly choose x, y ∈ Z q and compute g x , g y . Give (g, g x , g y ) to an adversary A, who intends to compute and output g xy . If for any PPT adversary, its advantage
is negligible, then we call the CDH assumption on G holds.
C. IB-SIGNATURE SCHEME
An IB-signature scheme IBS consists of the algorithms IBSetup, IBGen, IBExtract, IBSign, IBVerify. In particular,
• IBSetup : Take as input the security parameter λ. Output:
The public parameter par IBS , which will be implicit input for other algorithms.
• IBGen : This algorithm outputs the master secret key sk IBS and public verification key vk IBS .
• IBExtract : Take as inputs sk IBS and ID, which denotes some user's identity. Output: A secret key sk ID for the specific user ID.
• IBSign : Take as inputs user's secret key sk ID and a message m. Output: A signature σ for m.
• IBVerify : Take as inputs public verification key vk IBS , user's identity ID, message m and a signature σ . • Queries. A can adaptively make the following queries.
-Extracting Queries. Given the user's identity ID, the challenger runs
and returns it to A. -Signing Queries. When A submits an identity ID and a message m, the challenger runs
and gives σ to A.
• Output. Finally, A outputs a tuple of (ID * , m * , σ * ). The adversary A is called winning the game if ID * is not queried to IBExtract, (ID * , m * ) is not queried to IBSign, and
If for any PPT adversary A, he can win the game with at most negligible probability, then IBS is called CM-ID secure. In [11] , Choon and Cheon constructed a CM-ID secure IB-signature scheme based on the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption. Another candidate scheme is proposed by Paterson in [19] , which is based on bilinear pairings on elliptic curves.
D. IB-HOMOMORPHIC SIGNATURE SCHEME
Formally, an IB-Homomorphic signature scheme IBHS consists of the following algorithms: Setup, Gen, Extract, Sign, Verify and Combine, which are respectively described as follows.
• Setup : Take as input the security parameter λ. This algorithm generates some public parameters par that will be used for other algorithms. Generally, par will be an implicit parameter for the following algorithms.
• Gen : This algorithm generates the master secret/public key (sk, vk), where sk will be used by Extract to extract individual secret keys for users and vk is used by Verify to check the validity of signatures.
• Extract : Take as inputs the master key sk and user's identity ID. This algorithm computes and outputs sk ID , which is the extracted secret key for the user ID.
• Sign : Take as inputs the user's identity ID, its secret key sk ID , a file identifier id ∈ {0, 1} λ and a vector v. This algorithm outputs a signature Q for v.
• Verify : Take as inputs the master public key vk, user's identity ID, a file identifier id, a vector v, and a signature Q. This algorithm outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
• Combine : Take as inputs an identity ID, an identifier id, a set of tuples {(c i ,
, where Q i should be a signature of v (i) (identified by id) under the secret key sk ID . 2 Output: ⊥ (illegal inputs) or a combined signature Q (which is intended to be a signature for the combined
Next, we present how to introduce RKA to the above IBHS.
In fact, we consider its security against adaptively CM-IDattack, and the related key attack. Now, we introduce the following experiment which is played between a challenger Ch and an adversary A. Let be a set of functions from master secret key space to itself. Exp
• Initializes: The challenger Ch runs par ← Setup(λ), and (sk, vk) ← Gen(par), and gives par, vk to the adversary A. In addition, Ch also initializes an empty list T , which will be used to store A's signing queries.
• Queries: A can adaptively make the following queries.
--Extract Queries. For the identity ID and the RKD function φ ∈ from A, Ch computes
, ID) and returns it to A. --RKA-Signing Queries. When A submitting φ ∈ , user's identity ID, a file identifier id, and a vector v, the challenger Ch runs ID) , and
and returns Q to A. Then add (φ, ID, id, v, Q) to the table T .
• Output: Finally, A outputs a tuple of the form
We call A wins the game if
ID * is not queried to Extract, and one of the following cases occurs.
• Case 1. The identifier id * does not appear in T , and v * = 0. (Type 1 forgery) • Case 2. id * = id 0 , where id 0 is the identifier component for some queries appeared in T , and for those queries, there exists component (φ 0 , ID 0 ) satisfying 
III. THE ORIGINAL GOAL SCHEME
In this section, we first recall the IB-homomorphic signature scheme IBHS proposed by Lin et al. in [16] . More precisely, in this scheme, they used bilinear groups as the underlying tool and an IB-signature scheme IBS as the building block. If IBS consists of the algorithms IBSetup, IBGen, IBExtract, IBSign, IBVerify, then IBHS = (Setup, Gen, Extract, Sign, Verify, Combine) can be constructed as follows.
• Setup : Take the security parameter λ as input. First, choose bilinear groups
Randomly choose a generator g from G 1 and let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be the related bilinear map. Then, define H 1 , H 2 as two hash functions from {0, 1} * to G 1 and run par IBS ← IBSetup(λ). Let L be an empty set, which will be used to store the information for same identifier. Finally, output
which is implicit input for the following algorithms.
• Gen : Run (sk IBS , vk IBS ) ← IBGen(par IBS ). Then, randomly choose x ∈ [q] and compute h = g x . Let sk = (sk IBS , x) be the master secret key and vk = (vk IBS , h) be the master public key. Output (sk, vk).
• Extract : For the inputs ID and sk, this algorithm computes and outputs
• Sign: Take as inputs user's identity ID, its secret key (sk 1, ID , sk 2, ID ), a file identifier id ∈ {0, 1} λ and a vector
This algorithm first checks if the identifier id appears in L.
and add (id, (r, w, σ 1 )) to L. -Else, retrieve the information (r, w, σ 1 ) from L. Then, randomly choose s ∈ Z * q , and compute
Finally, output Q = (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s) as the signature of v, which belongs to the file named by id.
• Verify: Take as inputs ID, the master public key vk,
, and a signature Q. First, this algorithm parses Q as (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s). Then, checks if
If both of them hold, output 1. Else, output 0.
• Combine: Take as inputs ID, a file identifier id, and a set of tuples {(c i ,
should be the signature of v (i) . This algorithm first runs
If for some i, δ i = 0, then halt and output 0. Else, 3 compute
1 , σ 2 , s (as the signature of v = i=1 c i v (i) .)
The correctness of this scheme can be verified easily. 3 We remark that, if all δ i equals to 1, then we can know that
A. RELATED-KEY ATTACK ON IBHS
In this subsection, we present how to implement RKA on the above scheme IBHS. Note that the master secret key of IBHS has the form (sk IBS , x), and hence we denote by SK := SK 1 × SK 2 its master secret key space and = ( (1) , (2) ) the RKD function family, where (1) :
:
Now, an adversary A chooses the identity function I in (1) and the function φ (x) := x + in (2) , where ∈ SK 2 and = 0. Denote by φ = (I , φ ) and submit (ID, φ, id, v) to the challenger Ch. Let Q = (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s) be the response. then A can compute
and output (ID, id, v, (w, σ 1 , σ * 2 , s)) as its forgery. We will prove that, it can pass the verification corresponding to the master secret key (sk IBS , x) (i.e. type 3 forgery).
First, it obviously holds that
In addition, from the response to A, we know that
Hence,
Putting the facts together, we know that
That is, the output of A is a successful type 3 forgery. Therefore, IBHS is not secure under the related-key attack (with respect to the function family .)
B. THE IMPROVED SCHEME
Here, we consider the improved scheme IBHS consisting of the algorithms Setup , Gen , Extract , Sign , Verify , Combine , where Setup , Gen , Combine are respectively same as the corresponding ones in IBHS. Then the remaining three algorithms are as follows.
• Extract : This algorithm is identical to Extract except for the construction of sk 2, ID . Here,
• Sign : This algorithm is identical to Sign except for the computing of σ 2 . Concretely, σ 2 has the following form:
• Verify : It is identical to Verify except for the checking of (1). That is, (1) is modified as:
The correctness of IBHS can be easily verified. Next, we consider its CM-ID--RKA security. Specifically, we have the following theorem. Theorem 1: Let S be a CM-ID secure IB-signature scheme. Assume that CDH assumption on G 1 holds and H 1 , H 2 are modeled as two random oracles. Then the above IBHS is CM-ID--RKA secure, where = ({I }, lin ). Here, lin denotes the set of linear functions φ a,b : Z q → Z q , which has the form φ a,b (x) = ax + b mod q, for a, b ∈ Z q .
Proof: Let A be a PPT adversary attacking on the MC-ID--RKA security of IBHS . We need to construct another adversary B, who attacks on the CM-ID security of IB-signature scheme or CDH assumption, by using A as a subroutine. In order to clearly present our reduction, we further divide the type 3 forgery of Subsection II-D into the following two ones. (Type 4 forgery) . Now, we turn to the construction of B. Concretely, B randomly chooses b ← {1, 2, 3 , 4}, and guesses A will output a type b forgery.
• For the case b = 1, B will attack on the CM-ID security of the IB-signature scheme. Now, he is given the public parameter par IBS and verification key vk IBS . He generates G 1 , G 2 with |G 1 | = |G 2 | = q, chooses the bilinear map e and g ∈ G 1 as the generator. Set L = ∅. Then randomly choose x ∈ Z * q , compute h = g x and return 
Return (sk 1, ID , sk 2, ID ) to A. --RKA Signing Queries. When A submits φ = (I , φ a,b ) ∈ , user's identity ID, a file identifier id, and a vector v, B checks if this id appeared in L. If it is, then retrieve (r, w, σ ) from L. Else, randomly choose r $ ← − Z * q , compute w = g r , and submit (id, w) to its own challenger. Denote by σ 1 his challenger's response. Then store (ID, id, r, w, σ 1 ) into L. In addition, he also computes
randomly chooses s ← Z * q , and then computes 
and add (id , j , h ), 
and computes 
queries (ID, h φ ) to H 1 -oracle, and gets the response H 1 (ID, h φ ). * If this query is not the η-th one to H 1 -oracle, then let H 1 (ID, h φ ) = g t , and randomly choose r $ ← − Z * q , compute w = g r , and runs
Then store (ID, h φ , id, r, w, σ 1 ) into L. In addition, he also computes
and
Randomly chooses s ← Z * q , and then computes
Return Q = (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s) to A, and add ID, id, v, Q) to the table T . * Else, B will simulate as follows. Randomly choose r
and runs ID , (id, w) ).
Then store (ID, h φ , id, r, w, σ 1 ) into L. Query (id, j, h φ ) to H 2 -oracle and get the response
In addition, he also computes
Return the signature Q = (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s) to A. We can easily know Q is a correct signature. In fact, from
we know that
Therefore, it naturally holds that
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where Q * has the form of (w * , σ * 1 , σ * 2 , s * ). If A's output is a successful type 2 forgery, then
for some query (or queries) (φ 0 , ID 0 , id 0 , * , * ) appeared in T, 4 and v * / ∈ V , where V is the space spanned by all the vectors queried to signing oracle with the same (φ 0 , ID 0 , id 0 ) . Next, we analyze how B computes the target value g xy . Let (ID 0 , h) be the k-th query to H 1 -oracle. Then k = η occurs with probability In fact, if w * = w, then ((id * , w * ), σ * 1 ) will be a valid forgery for IBS. In addition, (σ * 2 , s * ) should satisfy
From the non-degenerate property of e, we have
then g xy can be calculated by
That is, the CDH problem is resolved.
From the following analysis, we will know that (3) will occur with probability 1 − 1 q . Concretely, from v * / ∈ V , we know that A at most queried N − 1 linear independent vectors with the same (I , id 0 , ID 0 ). (Otherwise, the 4 Here, * means any value.
be the basis of V and
the simulated signatures (by B) for v (i) . From the process of simulation, we can know that A collects the following system.
The combination of (3) and (4) forms
The coefficient determinant of (5) will be
since v / ∈ V . Therefore, the value s * is also random in A's view when it does not know α 1 , · · · , α N . In other words, (3) will occur with probability
where negl(λ) is some negligible function of λ.
• For the case b = 3 , B will also attack on the CM-ID security of IBS. The process of simulation is the same as that of case b = 1. The only difference lies in the analysis of B's forgery. Specifically, if the output of A is a successful type 3 forgery, then
and id * = id 0 , where id 0 is the identifier component for some queries appeared in T . Moreover, for all those queries
it holds that ID * = ID. VOLUME 7, 2019 From (6), we know that,
In addition, we can know w * = w. The reason lies in that w is randomly generated for the user ID to sign vectors with the identifier id 0 and hence it can not be the one for the different user ID * (except with a negligible possibility). Therefore, B's output
is a successful forgery (w.r.t. ID * ) for IBS.
• For the case b = 4, B will still attack on the CDH assumption on G 1 . The process of simulation for A is the same as that of case b = 2. The only difference lies in how B computes g xy from the output of A. In particular, from the type 4 forgery, we know that
and all φ = I , where
is the tuple(s) in T . 
That is, the CDH problem is resolved. Next, we prove that (7) occurs with probability 1 q . First, we know that (7) is equivalent to
From the simulation of B, we know that, A can at most collect the following ''useful" equations to compute (7):
Assume that A can resolve the DL problem and hence it at most obtains x, y, r and α j y + β j for j = 1, · · · , N . Because α j , β j 's are chosen randomly by B, α j 's are random in terms of A's view. Moreover, v * = 0 means at least one component v j does not equal to 0. Therefore, (7) holds with probability 1 q . Putting all the facts together, we know that Theorem 1 holds.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the efficiency of our improved IB-homomorphic signature scheme with that of Lin et al. in terms of computational costs. 5 Note that Setup , Gen and Combine are respectively same as the corresponding ones in IBHS and the differences of efficiencies for the two schemes may only occur in the remaining three algorithms. In fact, for those algorithms, the sole difference lies in the inputs of hash functions H 1 and H 2 , to which we only ''add'' the part public key h. Therefore, the changes for the inputs of H 1 and H 2 will not distinctly decrease the computational efficiencies compared with other operations, such as pairings, exponentiations etc.. Now, we implement the schemes within the framework of ''Charm'' in [1] . Our mechanism chooses the 512-bit SS elliptic curve from pairing-based cryptography (PBC) library [17] and the identity-based signature scheme in [19] . All the experiments are executed on Intel Core i5-6200U CPU @2.3GHz and 2GB RAM running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 64-bit and Python 3.4. The dimension N of a signed vector v is incremented from 10 to 100. Each instance is repeated 10 times and the average time is computed.
The comparison Extract with Extract is presented in Fig.1 . From this figure, we know that our improved algorithm Extract is slower (about 2 milliseconds) than the original Extract for the same dimension N and vector v.
However, the differences will become relatively smaller when other operations takes very long times. In particular, the total times for the algorithms Sign and Verify will respectively be hundreds of seconds and the additional times of ''adding'' h into the input of hash have extremely small effects on them. The concrete comparison Sign (resp. Verify) with Sign (resp. Verify ) is given in Fig. 2 (resp. 3) .
In a word, the computational efficiency of our modified scheme is almost same as that of the original Lin et al.'s one.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, for the first time, we consider the RKA security on the new cryptographic primitive: IB-homomorphic signature scheme, which is proposed by Lin et al. in 2018 . By presenting a concrete RKA on Lin et al.'s scheme, we illustrate that their scheme is not RKA secure. But a slight modification of it yields a -RKA secure IB-homomorphic signature scheme. The experiments show that our revised scheme almost has the same efficiency as that of Lin et al. ' MAOZHI XU is currently a Professor with the School of Mathematics, Peking University, Beijing, China. He has authored or coauthored more than 100 papers in some major journals and international conferences. His research interests include cryptography and information security.
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